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Election Administration in New York City:
Pruning the Political Thicket
On June 20, 1972, Allard K. Lowenstein' was defeated in his at-
tempt to wrest from incumbent Congressman John J. Rooney the
Democratic nomination to the United States House of Representatives
in New York's 14th congressional district.2 The final tabulation of
votes indicated that Lowenstein had lost the Democratic Party pri-
mary by 890 out of nearly 30,000 votes cast.8
Suspecting that massive electoral fraud had occurred, Lowenstein
filed suit to have the primary overturned .4 Although initially rejected,,
Lowenstein's legal challenge was successful on appealA Concluding
that the June 20 primary did not meet the "requisite standards" of
fair elections in a democracy, the Appellate Division of the New York
1. Lowenstein had been elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1968 from
New York's fifth congressional district in suburban Nassau County. See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 6, 1968, at 27, col. 7. Two years later the New York state legislature, which was
controlled by Republicans, redrew the boundary lines of the fifth district in what
has generally been viewed as a calculated attempt to unseat Lowenstein. See M. BARONE,
G. UJIFUSA & D. MATTHEWS, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS-1974, at 659 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as ALMANAC]. The gerrymander was successful and Lowenstein lost
his bid for reelection. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1970, at 1, col. 7. Accepting a draft
from the reform elements of the Democratic Party in Brooklyn, Lowenstein returned
to New York City in 1972 to run for Congress against John J. Rooney. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 18, 1972,.at 35, col. 4; id., Mar. 28, 1972, at 25, col. 1.
2. John J. Rooney was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1944. Cur-
rently the third ranking member of the powerful Appropriations Committee, he chairs
the subcommittee that supervises the Departments of State, Justice and Commerce. See
ALMANAC, supra note 1, at 680-81; JT. COMM. ON PRINTING, CONGRESSIONAL DIREcToRY 127,
187 (1974). After his reelection in 1972, Representative Rooney became seriously ill.
Acceding to pressure from the regular Brooklyn Democratic organization, he announced
his retirement in June 1974. See N.Y. Times, June 4, 1974, at 1, col. 7; id., Feb. 4,
1974, at 19, col. 3.
3. Statement and Return of the Votes for the Offices of Kings County, Democratic
Party Primary, June 20, 1972 (on file with the Yale Law Journal.
4. See N.Y. Times, June 23, 1972, at 19, col. 1.
5. Lowenstein v. Larkin, Civil No. 16590-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 31, 1972), rev'd mem.,
40 App. Div. 2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d 799, aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 654, 288 N.E.2d 133, 336
N.Y.S.2d 249 (1972).
6. 40 App. Div. 2d at 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 799. The journey of the Lowenstein case
through the courts was unusually rapid. Justice Rubin of the New York State Supreme
Court ruled against Lowenstein in a decision dated August 31, 1972. Oral argument
was heard by the Supreme Court's Appellate Division on September 5, and Justice
Rubin's ruling was reversed on September 7. The New York State Court of Appeals
affirmed the Appellate Division decision on September 13. The special election was
held six days later.
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Supreme Court ordered a special primary to be held on September 19,
1972."
At the special election, Lowenstein and his supporters experienced
many of the same irregularities that had occurred before, and the final
tally of votes that day indicated that Lowenstein had lost again.8
The question of whether or not John Rooney was renominated in
two primary elections actually won by Allard Lowenstein is one ques-
tion that may never be satisfactorily answered.9 This Note addresses
a larger question posed by the Lowenstein-Rooney primary: can an
insurgent, or reform, political candidate be assured a fair election
under current New York law?10 This Note will first demonstrate that
the New York Election Law cannot guarantee electoral fairness be-
cause it fails in practice to regulate political competition in New York
City. In light of this, it will then be argued that because of the par-
ticular political situation in New York City, the system of election
administration established by the New York Election Law leads to
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."'
7. 40 App. Div. 2d at 605, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 799. For a discussion of the legal standards
applied by New York courts to election challenges based on state law, see Note,
Primary Challenges in New York: Caselaw Coleslaw v. Election Protection, 73 COLUm.
L. REV. 318 (1973).
8. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1972, at 41, col. 1. Lowenstein was on the ballot in the
general election as the Liberal Party candidate, receiving approximately 28 percent of
the vote in a three-way race. See id., Nov. 9, 1972, at 28, col. 5.
9. The Appellate Division held that the first election had been "characterized by
such . . . irregularities as to render impossible a determination as to who rightfully
was nominated." 40 App. Div. 2d at 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 799, quoting N.Y. EtrEcrnoN
LAw § 330(2) (McKinney 1964).
10. As used in this Note, terms such as "insurgent," "reform," and "regular," have
a special meaning in the context of New York City politics. These terms refer to the
conflict between the Democratic Party's two competing factions-the majority "regular"
faction, which is committed to organizing the party as an old style political machine,
and the minority "reform" faction, which prefers a less authoritarian party structure.
This internecine dispute has so dominated Democratic Party politics in New York City
that Professor Wilson has termed the history of the party a "history of insurgency." J.
WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT 32-64 (1970) (especially at 36). See generally E. Cosri-
KYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS (1966). For a discussion of the regular faction at its height,
see A. CONABLE & E. SiLBERFARB, TIGERS OF TAMMANY (1967) (Democratic Party leader-
ship in Manhattan).
Despite the infamy of Tammany and its bosses, the regular Democratic organization
in Kings County (Brooklyn) has actually dominated the politics of the city for a longer
period of time. W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY 688-89 (1960). It
was this organization-the Brooklyn machine-Lowenstein challenged by opposing Rep-
resentative Rooney.
11. This Note does not contend that all statutory schemes similar to the New York
law are unconstitutional per se. The validity of any statute would depend upon whether
its provisions accurately reflected the divergence of political viewpoints in the par-
ticular state. For instance, a statute placing election administration in the hands of
the leaders of a state's two major parties, as New York's does, may be permissible
where the significant political forces in the state are reflected in, and channelled
through, those two major parties. On the other hand, if the two major parties are
opposed from within by internal factions and from without by minor parties and
independents, then those elements of the electorate are in danger of having their
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I. The Lowenstein-Rooney Primary: A Case Study in the Inadequacy
of the Election Law
12
On June 20, 1972, both the Democratic and Republican parties
held primary elections in New York. These elections were adminis-
tered by election officials selected according to the current New York
constitutional rights infringed by the imposition of unequal burdens and the unfair
administration of elections.
Whether the danger is merely speculative, or whether fundamental voting rights are
actually jeopardized by a state's election law is a determination of fact based on a
particular political situation. In the past, courts have looked beyond the facial pro-
visions of election laws to consider the relationship of their provisions to the political
dynamics of a particular situation. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 146
(1972) (candidacy filing fees must be examined in a "realistic light," and judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that the Texas primary election is of greater political im-
portance than the ensuing general election); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)
(recognition that a facially neutral law favoring a "two-party system" actually grants
a monopoly to two particular parties-the Democrats and Republicans).
Viewing in a "realistic light" the political situation in New York City, this Note
argues that the New York Election Law is invalid under both the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the statute may be
unconstitutional in any of three ways: (1) It could be found to contravene fundamental
rights in a specific instance, and a new election could be ordered in the particular
situation; (2) it could be invalidated because its general application has led repeatedly
and consistently to violations of constitutional rights; (3) it could be found to be un-
constitutional on its face, regardless of its actual effect in practice.
Although it is not contended here that the New York Election Law is facially un-
constitutional, a realistic consideration of its continued and virtually uniform effect
leads to the conclusion that it should be invalidated in general application rather than
only in specific instances. This is the only effective form of judicial relief for pro-
tecting fundamental constitutional rights which cannot meaningfully be vindicated
through individual litigation challenging each instance of unfairness. See p. 82 infra;
Allee v. Medrano, 414 U.S. 1020 (1974) (police misconduct arising under both un-
constitutional statutes and unconstitutional application of valid laws enjoined); Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (constitutional challenge to California petition require-
ment for independent candidates remanded to district court for specific findings as to
the statute's effect "in the context of California politics"); Weiss v. Duberstein, Civil No.
C70-1200 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1971), remanded, Civil
No. C70-1200 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
876 (1972) (court order, following ruling that the New York Election Law was in part
unconstitutional, tailored to have narrow application).
12. Although the Lowenstein-Rooney June 1972 primary may be the most dramatic
example of an unfairly administered election, it is by no means unique. Earlier this
year, for example, a Manhattan school board election was invalidated and a new election
was ordered by Federal District Judge Charles E. Stewart, Jr. Citing many of the same
types of irregularities that characterized the Lowenstein-Rooney election, Judge Stewart
held that the substantial discrimination that had occurred required a new election. Coali-
tion for Educ. in Dist. One v. Board of Elections, 370 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y.), affd,
495 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1974).
Biased election administration is not a recent phenomenon in New York City. In 1940
the New York City Commissioner of Investigation completed a two-year study of the
city's Board of Elections. In the course of this investigation, his staff examined 1900,
or 12 percent, of the 15,640 election inspectors appointed in 1937. The examination
revealed that 197 inspectors were, themselves, district captains for their party; 328
inspectors had been recommended by district captains who were either their brother, sister,
mother, father, or uncle; 567 inspectors were politically active, in that they canvassed
or solicited petitions for particular candidates; 461 inspectors admitted that they were
required to join a political club and pay dues as a condition to obtaining their job.
In his report to the Mayor, the Commissioner concluded that the "likelihood of
prejudicing the public's right to impartial elections in favor of the party's self-interest
in winning the election is greatly increased" under such a system. W. HEr.RLANDs, AD-
MINISTRATION OF THE ELECTION LAW IN NEW YORK CrY 26 (1940).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 61, 1974
Election Law.' 3 Unfortunately, this statute failed to insure the fair-
ness of the Democratic primary in Brooklyn's 14th congressional
district. In fact, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court found that during the June primary, the election inspectors
totally or substantially ignored many of the safeguards enacted to in-
sure the integrity of the election.14 They repeatedly ignored challenges
made by Lowenstein poll watchers, refused to question challenged
voters under oath, and kept no record of challenges made. 15 And they
allowed 3,681 unqualified voters to cast ballots.' 0 At the same time,
they turned away hundreds of voters who had been directed to specific
polling places by the Board of Elections.' 7 In some polling places, the
election inspectors actively campaigned for Representative Rooney,
while intimidating and harassing Lowenstein poll watchers.' 8 Indeed,
one member of the Board of Elections publicly endorsed and sup-
ported Representative Rooney, while his wife ran on the Rooney slate
for district leader.
19
Lowenstein was also disadvantaged by the manipulation of the
mechanics of the election. Despite a statutory requirement to the
13. See pp. 66-67 infra for a fuller description of the manner in which election
officials are selected in New York.
14. 40 App. Div. 2d at 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
15. Id.
16. Id. It was stipulated by the parties at the Lowenstein trial that the following
irregular votes were cast in the June primary:
429 votes by persons who were not enrolled;
1,317 votes by persons who had not voted for at least two years in a general elec-
tion, and were therefore ineligible;
658 votes in the names of persons whose registration signatures were not in the
registration books at the polling places on election day;
436 votes by persons to whom official correspondence from the Board of Elections
had been returned as undeliverable by the Post Office, indicating a probable change
of residence, perhaps outside of the district;
8 forgeries and/or votes cast twice;
833 public counter discrepancies, i.e., the number of votes recorded by the voting
machines in excess of the physical count of voters made by the election inspectors.
Brief for Appellants at 18, Lowenstein v. Larkin, 40 App. Div. 2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1972). The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court cited in its opinion
only the public counter discrepancies, the uncompared signature votes, and the votes
cast by non-Democrats. The court noted, however, "There is more, but we think the
foregoing amply supports our finding that a new election is required." 40 App. Div.
2d at 605, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
17. 40 App. Div. 2d at 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
18. Id. There was testimony at the Lowenstein trial that in at least one instance,
Congressman Rooney himself was guilty of this misconduct. Record at 12227-28, Lowen-
stein v. Larkin, Civil No. 16590-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 31, 1972).
19. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1972, at 18, col. 3. Election inspectors were no less biased.
It was discovered during the Lowenstein trial, for instance, that the "majority of the
Democratic party election inspectors were public supporters of incumbent Congressman
John Rooney. Out of 286 inspectors in the four principal districts 113, or 40 percent,
had either signed or carried his petitions, and others were active in his campaign."
Brief for Appellants at 7, Lowenstein v. Larkin, 40 App. Div. 2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d
799 (1972).
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contrary, the Board of Election went out of alphabetical order to list
Rooney's name ahead of Lowenstein's on numerous ballots.20 At a
number of polling places in areas favorable to Lowenstein, the Board
did not provide for two voting machines, as required by law.21 The
lack of machines resulted in long lines, forcing many people to wait
several hours to vote and causing others to give up.22 The Chief Clerk
of the Board of Elections testified that there were 350 voting machines
at the disposal of the Board that day that went unused. 23 Eight days
before the election the Board moved the location of a polling place
solely at the request of a local Democratic Party leader; moreover,
notice of this change (and two earlier changes) was not sent to the
7,469 affected voters until less than five days before the election, in
violation of § 66 of the Election Law.24
In view of the differential treatment Lowenstein received from the
Board of Elections and the mistreatment his supporters suffered at
the hands of biased inspectors on election day, the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court concluded that the election was
"conducted so badly ... that every dictate of fairness and protection
of the voters' franchise demands a new election." 25 The abuses that
arose in this contest can be understood only in terms of the state sys-
tem for conducting primary elections as that system operates in New
York City.
20. Brief for Appellants at 13, Lowenstein v. Larkin, 40 App. Div. 2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d
799 (1972). If the Board of Elections had arranged the order of candidates' names ac-
cording to the governing statute, N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 242(a)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1973),
Lowenstein's would have appeared ahead of Rooney's on the ballot in a majority of
districts. Instead, Rooney was listed ahead of Lowenstein in 113 of 168 election districts.
Brief for Appellants at 13, Lowenstein v. Larkin, 40 App. Div. 2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d
799 (1972).
Both the courts and legislature in New York have recognized that the order in which
a candidate's name appears on the ballot may significantly affect the vote in an elec-
tion. In 1970 that state's highest court held it unconstitutional for an incumbent to
be deliberately given the advantage of being listed ahead of his or her opponent.
Holtzman v. Power, 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 34 App. Div.
2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824, aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970).
In response to this decision, the New York state legislature enacted N.Y. ELECTION LAW
§ 242(a)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1973), which requires the equitable rotation of ballot
position.
21. Brief for Appellants at 24, Lowenstein v. Larkin, 40 App. Div. 2d 604, 335
N.Y.S.2d 799 (1972). N.Y. ELECtrION LAW § 64.4 (McKinney 1964) requires two voting
machines at every polling place where 800 or more voters are enrolled.
22. There was testimony at the Lowenstein trial that throughout the day in the
first election district of the 52d assembly district (where Lowenstein received over 75
percent of the total vote), more than 100 people were waiting in line to vote. Re-
portedly, dozens left the overcrowded polling place without voting. Record at 1174-78,
Lowenstein v. Larkin, Civil No. 16590-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 31, 1972).
23. Id. at 148, 174.
24. 40 App. Div. 2d at 605, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
25. Id. at 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 799, quoting DeSapio v. Koch, 21 App. Div. 2d 20, 22,
247 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (1964).
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II. New York Election Law
A. Selection of Election Officials
The electoral misconduct that occurred in the Lowenstein-Rooney
primary is directly related to certain provisions of the New York Elec-
tion Law. These provisions effectively require the state to rely exclu-
sively on the leadership of the Democratic and Republican parties to
produce the personnel needed to conduct its elections. 26 Section 30
of the New York Election Law provides that in each county of the
state, and in the city of New York (which is itself five counties), a Board
of Elections be established to administer and supervise nearly every
aspect of the electoral process.2 T Each Board of Elections appoints
numerous election inspectors to whom it delegates the responsibility
for administering elections at each polling place. 28 Sections 30 and 31
of the New York Election Law provide that the commissioners of the
New York City Board of Elections be appointed by the City Council
from recommendations made by the county chairmen of the state's
two major political parties.2 9 Furthermore, the county chairmen sub-
sequently submit lists of individuals to be appointed election inspec-
26. See note 29 infra.
27. The New York City Board of Elections consists of ten election commissioners,
two from each borough. The duties and powers of these commissioners include: the
appointment of clerks and deputies, N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 36 (McKinney 1964); re-
moval for cause of appointed election officers, id. § 45; supervision of all voter regis-
tration, id. §§ 66, 75, 355; preparation of a challenge list of those who have lost the
right to register from a given address, id. § 410; the creation and alteration of election
districts, id. § 64; determination that a voter is not entitled to an absentee ballot, id.
§ 118; determination of objections to a petition or certificate of designation or nomina-
tion, id. § 145. For a general discussion of the role of election officials in election
administration, see J. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 108-20
(1934); E. LOGAN, SUPERVISION OF THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS AND RETURNS 33-41, 47-54
(1927).
28. The duties and powers of election inspectors include: registration of voters, N.Y.
ELECTION LAW §§ 354, 365 (McKinney 1964); opening of polling places on election day,
id. § 192; determining name, party registration, and address of voters, id. § 201; pro-
viding assistance in voting to illiterate, infirm, disabled or blind voters, id. § 199; ad-
ministering oaths to challenged voters, and questioning voters in regard to qualifications,
id. §§ 224-25; canvass of ballots returned and proclamation of results, id. §§ 207-16. In-
spectors are also given the authority to direct the arrest of any person refusing to
obey their commands, or who, in their opinion, is guilty of disorderly conduct disturbing
the proceedings at any voter registration meeting or polling place. Id. §§ 161, 193.4.
For a discussion of the potential control election inspectors have over the right to
vote, see J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 126-49; E. LOGAN, supra note 27, at 60-73; Note,
Protecting the Right to Vote: A Model Voter Challenge Statute, 78 YALE L.J. 662 (1969).
29. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 31 (McKinney 1964) defines the two parties eligible to
make recommendations as "the two political parties which at the general election last
preceding . . . cast the highest and the next highest number of votes for governor."
Despite the statute's neutral language, it is unlikely that any candidate but a Democrat
or Republican would poll a sufficient number of votes to finish first or second in the
gubernatorial election. Registration figures indicate that 49 percent of New York's
voters are Democrats, and 37 percent are Republicans; two percent belong to the Liberal
Party, and two percent to the Conservative Party. ALMANAC, supra note 1, at 650.
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tors to the very same commissioners the county chairmen had earlier
recommended for appointment to the Board of Elections.3" This statu-
tory scheme essentially limits the pool of potential election commis-
sioners and inspectors to those individuals whose political views are
favorable to the majority forces of the Democratic and Republican
parties in each county. Given the control the county chairmen exert
over the selection process, it is virtually impossible for a representative
of a reform faction of either party to receive the recommendation of
his county chairman and become an election official.
31
B. The Purpose of the Statute: An Historical and Political Perspective
Attempts to identify a statute's original legislative purpose rarely
enjoy the usual advantages of hindsight. In this instance, however, both
case law and legislative action strongly suggest that New York chose to
rely on the state's two major political parties for the production of
election officials in order to insure electoral fairness through biparti-
san administration of elections.
The sections of the New York Election Law that mandate the bi-
partisan administration of elections have statutory antecedents as early
as 1840.32 In 1894 the state legislature passed a statute essentially
equivalent to the current election law, the central provisions of which
-bipartisan administration based on party control of election officials
-were made part of the state constitution in the same year. 3 Although
30. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 40 (McKinney 1964). Laws that give political party leaders
the authority to choose individuals for public jobs are by no means unusual in New
York. In fact, such laws provide the party leaders with their major source of political
patronage. Not only do the county chairmen designate election officials, they also
control judgeships and numerous other political appointments. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
April 15, 1974, at 33, col. 4.
31. The general practice ini New York City is for assembly district leaders to recruit
potential election inspectors and send their names to the county chairmen for nomina-
tion. Therefore, in the few assembly districts where the reform faction has elected a
district leader, the names of reformers have on occasion been submitted, and they
have been nominated for appointments. Interview with Anne Feldman, Vice Chair-
woman of the New York State New Democratic Coalition, in New York City, June 1,
1974. Although it is thus possible in some cases for a reformer to become an election
inspector, it would be highly unusual for a county chairman to recommend a reform
member of his party for appointment as an election commissioner. Id.
32. See, e.g., ch. 78, [1840] Laws of N.Y. 63d Sess. 52-58. Although this statute did
not specifically require election officials to be of different political views, it did pro-
vide for minority representation on election boards. It was not until 1887 that election
laws were passed authorizing political party leaders to name election officials for bi-
partisan boards. 3 C. LINCOLN, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 124
(1906). For a brief historical sketch of the New York state legislature's experimentation
with a variety of election administration schemes, see generally id. at 114-31.
33. Compare ch. 348, [1894] Laws of N.Y. 117th Sess. 675-83, with N.Y. ELECTION
LAW §§ 30, 31, 40, 41 (McKinney 1964). See generally 3 REVISED RECORD OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 110-16, 244-72, 540-45 (1900). See
also C. LINCOLN, supra note 32, at 127-31.
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one delegate to the Constitutional Convention condemned party con-
trol over the selection of election officials and objected to a "bipartisan
. . . board chosen . . . at the dictation of a lot of cheap ward politi-
cians, ' 3 4 the majority view was that bipartisan boards were necessary
to secure the "purity of elections." 35 The courts early recognized the
statute's purpose. In 1911 the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court wrote that it could see a "clear exposition of the pur-
poses of the statute; it is to provide for a bipartisan election board
in the city of New York." 36
Viewed as "good government" reforms aimed at insuring electoral
fairness to candidates and voters, bipartisanship requirements for elec-
tion officials were instituted not only in New York but throughout the
country during the middle and late 19th century.37 It was believed
that electoral fraud and corruption would be best prevented by placing
representatives of competing political interests in positions as election
officials. 38 Adoption of bipartisan systems led directly to reliance on
party selection of election officials. Any system based on partisanship,
including one that attempts to check potential excesses by equalizing
partisanship, requires some method of verifying the "interest" of its
personnel. Political party leaders were obviously in the best position
to provide that certification. Hence, bipartisan administration and
party designation of officials were perceived as a means of building
into election administration an institutional system of checks and bal-
ances. The power of this sentiment is revealed by the fact that currently
34. REvisn REcoan, supra note 33, at 249 (remarks of Benjamin Dean).
35. Id. at 110 (remarks of Edward Lauterbach). For the amendment in its perfected
form, see N.Y. Const. art. II, § 6 (1894). The amendment has survived, with its pro-
visions virtually intact. See N.Y. CoNrsr. art. II, § 8.
Interestingly, a close study of the debate over the adoption of the 1894 amendment
indicates that the Lauterbach proposal was expressly intended to apply only to election
inspectors, and not to election commissioners. See REvISED RECORD, supra note 33, at
245, 247. Nevertheless, as subsequent statutes further delineated the separate positions,
provisions were regularly made in both cases for the bipartisan requirement and party
control over selection. See, e.g., ch. 909, §§ 11, 12, [1896] Laws of N.Y. 119th Sess.
904-07; ch. 22, [1909] Laws of N.Y. 132d Sess. 15.
36. Kane v. Gaynor, 144 App. Div. 196, 199, 129 N.Y.S. 280, 283 (1911). This same
legislative purpose was reiterated two years later in People ex rel. Woods v. Flynn,
81 Misc. 279, 283, 142 N.Y.S. 230, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1913), where the New York Supreme
Court found the "paramount idea of the Legislature by the passage of this law was
that these boards of election commissioners should be bipartisan in their character, to
the end that the dominant parties in this state should have equal representation
on such boards."
Bipartisanship was no less required for election inspectors. A New York court held
in 1896 that it was a criminal offense to violate the principle of equal representation
on boards of election inspectors. People v. Gleason, 18 Misc. 511, 42 N.Y.S. 1084 (Sup.
Ct. 1896).
37. See J. HARMS, supra note 27, at 114; E. LOGAN, supra note 27, at 4-7 (biparti-
sanship requirement was enacted in Pennsylvania to "end the increasing struggle be-
tween the parties to secure control of the election boards").
38. See J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 114; E. LOGAN, supra note 27, at 4-7.
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48 states organize their election administrations on a partisan basis;3 9 at
least 11 states either permit or specifically provide for multipartisan
election administration; 40 a greater number of states limit election
administration to the two major parties;41 while only the statutes of
California and South Carolina are silent on the issue of the political
party affiliation of those who administer elections.42
Though theoretically sound, the effort to secure fair elections
through bipartisan administration and party selection of election of-
ficials has been unsuccessful in New York City. The reason for this
failure is that these 19th century regulations have not kept pace with
either 20th century electoral reforms or changing political develop-
ments. Enactment of a law in 1911 requiring direct primary elections
of party nominees, rather than a system of designating candidates
39. ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 125 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 15.10.150 (1971); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-771 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-501, 3-502 (Cum. Supp. 1969); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 49-9-4 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 9-190, 9-192 (1967); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, § 4731 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.012 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 34-501 (1933); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 11-71 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 34-303 (1973);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 13-1 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-5-11 (1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.12 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-2802, 25-2803 (1973); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 116.070 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. § 18:555 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 532 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1973); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 54, § 118 (1971); MICH. CoN! P. LAWS ANN. § 168.674 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 203.21 (Supp. 1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-5-99 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 111.181, .191
(Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-604 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-404 (1968);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.217 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59:30 (1955); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 19:6-3 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-9 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. ELECTION LAW
§§ 30, 31, 40 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-41 (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 16-10-08 (Supp. 1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.06 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, . 32 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. § 246.310 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 2671, 2675 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-11-11 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
12-15-1, -3 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-1109 (1955); TEX. ELEcTION CODE, art. 3.01
(1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-7-10 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1003, 1005 (1957);
VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-106 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.45.010 (1965); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 3-1-28 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 7.30 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-13 (1957).
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 4731 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-501 (1933); HAWAiI
REV. STAT. § 11-71 (1968) (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 34-303 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 49.12 (1973); L.%. REV. STAT. § 18:555 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 532
(1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-41 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 32 (1951);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 12-15-1, -3 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1003, 1005 (1957).
41. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 13-1 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-5-11
(1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-2802, 25-2803 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 116.070 (1971); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 33, § 2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 203.21 (Supp. 1974); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 111.181, .191 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-404 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 59:30 (1955); N.Y. ELECTION LAW §§ 30, 31, 40 (McKinney Supp. 1973); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3501.06 (Page 1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-11-11 (1969); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-1109 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1003, 1005 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 29.45.010 (1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-28 (1966).
42. In South Carolina the governor appoints county boards of election upon the
recommendation of state senators and representatives from each county. The board
members then appoint managers for each polling place. These positions require no
prerequisites as to qualifications or party membership. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-306 (1962).
California elections are administered by the Secretary of State through nonpartisan
officials, such as the county clerk or registrar of voters. The position of election
inspector is open to all registered Voters who file applications for appointment. CAL.
ELECTIONS CODE § 1615 (West 1961).
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through a party convention proceeding, was the legislation that first
undercut the system of safeguards attempted by the earlier reforms.
The emergence of the Democratic Party, and thus the Democratic Party
primary, as the dominant force in New York City politics has further
compounded the problem.
C. Development of the Direct Primary Election
Nineteenth century legislators appear to have been generally un-
concerned about regulating intraparty competition.4 3 Early party pri-
maries were considered internal, almost private, party matters, and as
such were left virtually unsupervised. 44 The New York Election Law
of 1887 allowed parties to prescribe their own voter qualifications,
and therefore party leaders could effectively prevent dissident party
members from voting in primary elections.45 Although initial legis-
lative attempts to reform the primary system proved unsuccessful, 40
dissatisfaction with such tightly controlled party primaries ultimately
led to the passage in 1911 of a law requiring the direct election by
the voters of all party candidates except those seeking statewide of-
fice.47 Direct primary elections were a revolutionary innovation in
New York politics that promised to "permit the voters to construct
the [party] organization from the bottom upwards, instead of per-
mitting leaders to construct it from the top downwards.
' 48
D. Defects in the New York Election Law
Both the move toward bipartisan election supervision and the re-
quirement of direct primaries represent legislative responses to reform
43. This legislative indifference is revealed by the fact that no regulation of party
primaries even existed until 1882. Ch. 154, [1882] Laws of N.Y. 105th Sess. 188-89, is
New York state legislature's first attempt to regulate the conduct of party primaries.
The statute enacted the most basic restrictions, declaring illegal such activity as ballot
box stuffing, intimidation and impersonation of voters, and the destruction of ballots.
44. L. ABRAHAMS, NEW YORK ELECTION LAW MANUAL WITH FORMS 83 (1939): "Prior
to 1911 tinder the rules which then allowed the political party organization in power
to conduct its own private primaries unsupervised, it permitted the election of dele-
gates at the primary elections. These delegates, in turn, met at different conventions
and made nominations. The organization men generally nominated any candidate
whom the leader might select." See also B. GASSMAN, ELECTION LAW 37 (1957); F. DAL-
LINGER, NOMINATIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES 95-110 (1897).
45. Ch. 265, [1887] Laws of N.Y. 110th Sess. 329-333. However, it was soon recog-
nized that the power to "prescribe tests or qualifications for a voter was . . .employed
• * * to exclude from participation in the primary .. .members of a minority faction
in the party." People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Comm., 164 N.Y. 335, 340, 58 N.E.
124, 125 (1900) (Parker, Ch. J.).
46. In 1898 the state legislature limited the power of political parties to set voter
qualifications for primaries, permitting only the requirement that voters make a
general expression of intent to support the party and its candidates. Ch. 179, [1898]
Laws of N.Y. 121st Sess. 331-59. See also notes 38, 43 supra.
47. Ch. 891, [1911] Laws of N.Y. 134th Sess. 2681-82.
48. People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Comm., 164 N.Y. 335, 342, 58 N.E. 124,
126 (1900).
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impulses aimed at regulating political competition. Ironically, at the
same time the legislature recognized the critical importance of intra-
party contests and sought to free them from the control of party
leaders by mandating a direct primary, legislative acceptance for pri-
mary elections of a statutory scheme designed to regulate general
elections allowed that domination to continue.
This unfortunate consequence resulted from the failure to recog-
nize the fundamental difference between primary and general elec-
tions. Although a law providing for bipartisan representation and
party designation of election officials may be effective in a general
election, where the interests of the two dominant parties are usually
antagonistic, the same cannot be said of primary elections that are
necessarily characterized by intraparty factional disputes. Election of-
ficials selected in accordance with the New York Election Law cannot
help but identify with the faction whose leaders provided their jobs.
They therefore have an interest in bringing about a particular result
at the primary-the success of their faction's candidates. Moreover, it
would be a mistake to think that the Republican members of the
Board of Elections and their counterparts on the boards of inspectors
vigilantly safeguard the rights of insurgent Democrats. Republican
and Democratic election officials often cooperate with one another
in order to protect their common interest in maintaining the status
quo.49 Officials of the opposite party are not sufficiently concerned
with the outcome of a factional fight in the ranks of the opposing
party to oversee diligently the administration of the election.
The adverse effect resulting from this lack of effective supervision
over primaries is magnified in importance because of the significance
of the Democratic primary election. Because the Republican Party
is substantially outnumbered in New York City,50 meaningful com-
49. Interview with David Dinkins, former President of the New York City Board
of Elections, in New York City, Nov. 2, 1973. This has been recognized by the media,
see N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1972, at 42, col. 7 ("Regular organization candidates and their
lawyers, whether Democrat or Republican, are welcomed like comrades-in-arms at the
Board of Elections offices, while insurgents and reformers are treated like interlopers
and malcontents.") (emphasis supplied).
Such a situation is not a recent development. One commentator has noted that the
"theory that each side will watch the other is not valid, for many election frauds
are committed with the mutual connivance of the election officers of both parties."
J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 133. A former City Commissioner of Investigation ex-
pressed a similar observation by reporting that, "There are officially recorded instances
where the local representatives of one major political organization served as an adjunct
to the other." W. HERLANDS, supra note 12, at 27.
50. New York City contains 18 congressional districts. Two of these districts include
substantial portions of nearby suburbs. The average New York City congressional district
-excluding the two that straddle the city's borders-has an electorate that is 17 percent
Republican and 69 percent Democratic. Eleven of these congressional districts are less
than 20 percent Republican, while nine are, at least 70 percent Democratic. Brooklyn's
14th congressional district is 71 percent Democratic and only 17 percent Republican.
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petition in the political arena takes place only between rival factions
of the Democratic party. Since the Democratic nomination is tanta-
mount to election victory in most races, with the general election
merely a ratification of that earlier decision, the Democratic primary
is effectively the determinant stage of the electoral process. But it
is at just this stage that the guarantees of fairness are absent. By
entrusting the selection of election officials to the established party
leadership, the law operates to exclude supporters of reform candi-
dates from serving as election officials. The competitive check con-
templated by the bipartisan system is therefore completely absent, so
that the interests of reform candidates and of individuals wishing to
vote for them are unprotected. In effect, then, the New York Election
Law operates to allow the regular faction of the Democratic Party
inordinate influence not only over the party's nominating procedure
but also over the entire electoral process. 51
III. The Unconstitutionality of the New York Election Law
A. Equal Protection Analysis: The Rights to Vote and to Associate
Despite Justice Peckham's confident assertion in 1904 that the
Constitution "does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone,15 2
the Supreme Court has since recognized the fundamental nature of
the right to vote as "preservative of all other rights." 3 Although there
is no constitutionally protected right to vote as such 5 4 the "Court
has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the
jurisdiction."' 5
The Supreme Court has not only recognized the right to vote as
ALMANAC, supra note 1, at 662-706. The lack of significant electoral competition of-
fered by a Republican congressional candidacy in the 14th congressional district is re-
vealed by the total campaign expenditure of the Republican congressional candidate
in 1972-$270. COMMON CAUSE CAMPAIGN MONITORING PROJECT, CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES
FOR ALL NOVEMBER, 1972 HOUSE RACES 13 (Nov. 1973).
51. Of course, any general election competition generated by minor party and in-
dependent candidates and voters is similarly hindered by their exclusion from election
administration.
52. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904). For an opinion questioning the
continued vitality of Pope, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 362 (1971) (Blackmun,
J., concurring), where it is asserted that the Supreme Court's attempt to "blithely
explain away" Pope actually overruled it.
53. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, at 561-62 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
54. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 621 (1894). See also San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) (Powell, J.); id. at 59 n.2 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
55. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1971). See also San Antonio School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74, n.78 (Powell, J.) (1973); id. at 59 n.2 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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fundamental, but has also broadened the scope of protection afforded
the right. For many years the Court was primarily concerned with
protecting the right to vote from flagrant forms of discrimination.
More recently the Court has shifted its focus from this basic protection
of the franchise to making the right to vote more meaningful.57 This
shift began with the Reapportionment Decisions, in which the Su-
preme Court promoted the ideal "that as nearly as possible all men
should count as one politically, however different their other cir-
cumstances. ' ' Expressing this idea, Chief Justice Warren stated in
Reynolds v. Sims that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political process."' 9 Con-
stitutional protection of voting rights has been extended to include
state as well as federal elections ° and primary as well as general
elections.01
56. Accordingly, the Court held to be unconstitutional: the all-white primary, Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); ballot box stuffing,
United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); the failure to count votes honestly, United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); the intimidation of voters, Ex parte Yarborough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884).
57. See, e.g., A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, THE ELECTION PROCESS: VOTING LAWS AND
PROCEDURES 80-84, 150-51 (1972). See generally R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (1970); Kirby, The Constitutional Right to Vote, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 995 (1970). For perhaps the most eloquent expression of the expansive view of
voting rights, see Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 250 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting):
It is not merely the casting of the vote or its mechanical counting that is protected
by the Constitution. It is the function-the office-the effect given to the vote,
that is protected.
A vote is not an object of art. It is the sacred and most important instrument of
democracy and of freedom. In simple terms, the vote is meaningless-it no longer
serves the purpose of the democratic society-unless it, taken in the aggregate with
the votes of other citizens, results in effecting the will of those citizens provided
they are more numerous than those of differing views.
58. R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 582 (1968).
59. Reynolds v. Sims, 277 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). The Reapportionment Decisions,
along with the congressional districting cases, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), have provided the constitutional
foundation for a broad protection of activities related to voting rights designed to in-
sure that all voters can participate in the political process fully and effectively. Sea,
e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974) (right to vote of individuals detained in
prison upheld); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency require-
ments for voters unconstitutional); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (property
ownership cannot be required for voting in general obligation bond election); Evans
v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (residents of a federal enclave permitted to vote in
state elections); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (property ownership
requirements for bond issue elections held unconstitutional); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
814 (1969) (burdensome petition requirements held unconstitutional); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (ballot access for minor party candidates protected); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax declared unconstitutional); Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (exclusion of military residents from voting held
unconstitutional). But see cases cited at note 67 infra.
60. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Anderson v. United States, 415 U.S. 924 (1974) (intent to fraudulently influence
a state or local election sufficient to sustain a conviction under a federal conspiracy
statute).
61. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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The Supreme Court has also been solicitous of the right to asso-
ciate. This right is a substantive freedom derived from the First
Amendment. 62 Recognizing that the right to associate, like the right
to vote, is instrumental in the attainment of other fundamental liber-
ties, the Court has protected the right to combine and organize for
the advancement of political or social views.63
The constitutional protection accorded the rights to vote and to
associate has had a powerful impact on statutes regulating electoral
activity. This is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Williams v. Rhodes. 4 In 1968 the American Independent Party and
the Socialist Labor Party challenged the Ohio procedures used to
choose electors for President and Vice President of the United States.
Plaintiffs alleged that the procedures discriminated against minority
parties and thereby violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Writing for the Court, Justice Black characterized the right of as-
sociation and the right to vote as ranking among "our most precious
freedoms," and rejected the justifications advanced by the state as
insufficient to allow infringements upon those fundamental rights.,,,
The legal test that emerged from Williams is an exacting one: If a
state statute imposes an unequal burden on the fundamental rights
to vote and to associate, the statute is unconstitutional under the
62. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See generally C. RicE, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION (1962); Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE LJ. 1 (1964).
63. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Justice Stewart wrote that the freedom
of association protected the litigation activities of the NAACP because they were di-
rected toward obtaining equality of governmental treatment for all black Americans.
Similarly, in United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967), the
Court struck down a state order prohibiting a union-organized system of delivering legal
advice to workers as a violation of the union members' freedom to associate in order
to exercise more fully their legal rights.
64. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Williams was a momentous decision that plunged the ju-
diciary farther into the political thicket than it had ever before ventured. Chief Justice
Warren, in a dissent to the majority opinion, compared the potential effect of Williams
to that of the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr. 393 U.S. at 63. Compare Williams,
with Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (similar petition requirement statute in
Georgia upheld); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1974) (ballot access restrictions approved). See generally Barton, Afore
Nominees or More Representative Nominees?, 22 STAN. L. REv. 165 (1970) (significance
of Williams may be that it is the Court's first attempt to construct constitutional norms
for the representation of divergent viewpoints within election' systems); Tile Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 86 (1969); 6 HARV. J. LEois. 236 (1969).
65. The members of the American Independent Party had collected the required
number of signatures to place George Wallace's name on the ballot, but not by the
statutory deadline. The Socialist Labor Party had failed to obtain sufficient signatures.
Both parties were denied a place on the ballot by the Ohio Secretary of State.
66. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
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Equal Protection Clause unless the state can offer a compelling jus-
tification for that unequal burden. 67
The New York law violates equal protection because it infringes
upon the fundamental rights to vote and to associate. This occurs in
two ways. First, everyone other than a member of the dominant fac-
tion of a major political party is excluded in practical effect from
serving as an election official. It is unlikely that a party chairman
would nominate to a valuable political position"" a person who is
not a loyal party member. Such preclusion is a burden that regular
party members do not bear. Moreover, those people systematically ex-
cluded from serving as election officials are forced to exercise their
rights in a partisan system that is politically hostile to them. The
Lowenstein-Rooney contest demonstrates that voters and candidates
who oppose the Democratic machine in New York City do not have
an opportunity to participate equally in the election process,69 thus
resulting in a debasement or dilution of their votes. 70 Although the
abuses that occurred in this primary should not happen under any
electoral system, New York law permits these occurrences by its use
67. Id. at 31. The Court has seemingly applied a lesser standard in certain other
cases involving voting rights. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974);
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973);
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973); Salyer v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Improvement Dist., 410
U.S. 803 (1972). These decisions seem to indicate that although "not every limitation
or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard
of review," Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972), only a very limited imposition
on the exercise of those rights appears to be constitutionally permissible.
68. Election commissioners are paid a maximum of $5,000 per year. N.Y. ELECTION
LAW . 33 (McKinney Supp. 1973). In Weiss v. Duberstein, 445 F.2d 1297, 1301 (2d
Cir. 1971), the court observed that only the "politically naive" would conclude that
the Democratic and Republican County Committees would use the statute to select
anyone but those politically active individuals with whom they were aligned. In 1972,
election inspectors earned 520 per day. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1972, at 41, col. 3.
69. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (right of association means little if
a political party can be denied "an equal opportunity to win votes").
Admittedly, because of the facts of the case, Williams refers specifically to political
parties. This gives rise to the possibility that the holding would not apply to voters
and candidates within a faction of an established party, such as Lowenstein and his
supporters. Although the focus in Williams was on party organizations, it would be
difficult to imagine the Court reaching a different decision if the plaintiffs had been
individual candidates rather than organized political parties. Burdensome restrictions
on the individual candidate would still infringe upon the rights to associate and to
cast effective votes.
Despite the traditional judicial reluctance to interfere with the internal affairs of a
party, the constitutional mandate of Williams compels such interference in the situation
of the New York Election Law. Recognition of the need to protect the right to vote
has prompted greater departures from judicial restraint in the past. See, e.g., Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1952); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Because of its
partisan nature, the New York election machinery effectively denies an effective voice
to reformers, independents, and minority party members. The protection of Williams
ought not to be withheld because of a party designation.
70. Such a debasement or dilution is just as surely a denial of the right of suf-
frage as if those voters had been prohibited from voting at all. Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
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of partisan officials who administer elections in an unfair and dis-
criminatory manner.
Given the burdens that the New York law places on the rights to
vote and to associate, the statute can be justified only by a compelling
state interest.71 The original purpose of the New York law was to
insure fairness through bipartisanship.7 2 The present statutory scheme,
however, fails to serve that purpose in either the primary or the
general election. The actual administration of the primary election
is highly partisan, with the check of bipartisan supervision completely
absent. Since New York City is politically dominated by one party,
control of the Democratic primary is essentially control of the out-
come of the general election. 73 Election administration in New York
City is thus bipartisan in form only; in substance it is intensely
partisan.
Conceivably, there are two other justifications for the statute that
might be offered, but neither of them is persuasive. It might be ar-
gued, as it was in Williams, that the law ought to be retained because
it promotes the two-party system. However, the New York Election
Law promotes only the Democratic and Republican parties 7 4 and, as
the Court held in Williams, promotion of two particular parties is
not a legitimate goal.75 In addition, the law may actually encourage
the proliferation of minority parties. The present statute concentrates
power in the hands of the regular organizations of the Democratic
and Republican parties. This power is often exerted at the expense
of internal reform factions. Those factions which feel powerless within
their own parties may, therefore, seek that power by forming new
political parties, thus resulting in an increase in the number of such
organizations. 7
6
71. If a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies
the franchise to others, "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary
to promote a compelling state interest." Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 627 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
72. See pp. 67-68 supra.
73. See note 50 supra.
74. See note 29 supra.
75. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1968).
76. See Barton, supra note 64. To argue that the New York Election Law may
operate both to discriminate against minor parties and to encourage their growth
seems at least superficially contradictory. This seeming inconsistency is reconciled, how-
ever, when one realizes that the impact of the statute is different over time and in
different political situations. For instance, if the divergent political viewpoints of the
electorate are substantially represented by, and channelled through, the two major
parties and a number of minor parties, the discriminatory impact occurs. On the
other hand, where the political forces in the electorate are organized in such a way
that significant political competition expresses itself in a factionalized major party,
then over time the statute may encourage the minority faction to forsake its parent
party to gain the autonomy of a separate, minor party status. The latter process is
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The other possible justification for the current law is the efficiency
of its administration. 7 The maintenance of an administrative system
that subverts the very integrity of elections certainly cannot be tol-
erated, regardless of its efficiency. Moreover, there is considerable
evidence that the present New York City system is woefully ineffi-
cient.78 Finally, there is no reason to believe that an alternative that
would necessitate fewer sacrifices of fundamental rights would not be
at least as efficient.
79
Clearly, none of these possible rationales is sufficiently compelling
to justify the incursions on fundamental rights caused by the unequal
burden of the New York Election Law. The statute therefore must
be invalidated as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."0
especially significant because the meaningful political competition in New York City
is currently organized in such a way that it more closely conforms to the factionalized
major party pattern.
77. See, .e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1972) (state's argument that
extreme filing fees necessary for the administration of party primaries rejected). The
major efficiency factor involved in election administration is the recruitment of the
large number of part-time personnel actually needed to serve as inspectors. A federal
court hearing a challenge to an Ohio election statute similar to the New York law
seemed to be influenced by this consideration. Pirincin v. Board of Elections, 368 F.
Supp. 64, 71-72 (N.D. Ohio 1973). The court in Pirincin refused to apply strict scrutiny,
holding that the Ohio statutory scheme for selecting board members did not infringe
upon the right to vote in that election officials were appointed, not elected. See
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.78 (1973) (voting rights pro-
tection extends only to right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified
voters when the state has adopted an elective process) (emphasis supplied); the court
also required the plaintiff to demonstrate "inherent bias" on the part of the Board
of Elections, which he failed to do. Evidently, examples of bias such as those that
occurred in the Lowenstein-Rooney primary were not readily available.
The decision in Pirincin should be no bar to suits challenging election administration
laws similar to those in New York and Ohio. It appears that one of the primary
reasons for plaintiff's failure was the manner in which he argued the case. Pirincin
contended that he had a constitutional right to vote for an election inspector, which
was denied him because he was a political independent and the Ohio statute called
for party designation of election officials. The outcome of the case might have been
different had he argued that there was a constitutional right to be free from dis-
criminatory election administration and that this right was infringed by the effect
of the statutory selection of election officials.
78. Election administration is so badly mismanaged in New York that many people
believe electoral misconduct is more accurately attributable to nonfeasance than to
malfeasance. Interview with David Dinkins, former President of the New York City
Board of Elections, in New York City, Nov. 2, 1973. One New York City congressman
described the administration of the June, 1972, primary as "total incompetence." 118
CoNG. Rrc. E6733 (daily ed. June 30, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Scheuer). See also N.Y.
Times, Sept. 25, 1972, at 41, col. 1.
79. For a discussion of possible alternatives, see pp. 83-84 infra.
80. In addition to being unconstitutional because it imposes unequal burdens on
voting rights, the New York Election Law can also be considered invalid as an im-
permissible infringement on the fundamental rights of the candidates themselves. The
theory that candidates' rights are fundamental is based on the premise that the
candidates' right to run is correlative with the citizens' right to vote for them. Be-
cause a state statute that regulates candidacies simultaneously restricts the ability of
citizens to vote for the candidates of their choice and thereby impinges on fundamental
rights, it should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Note, Durational
Residence Requirements for State and Local Office: A Violation of Equal Protection?,
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B. Due Process Analysis
In addition to the denial of equal protection that results from the
imposition of unequal burdens upon certain voters and candidates,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 996 (1972); Note, Equal Protection and Property Qualifications for
Elective Office, 188 U. PA. L. REv. 129, 137-42 (1969); Comment, The Emerging Right
to Candidacy in State and Local Elections, 17 WAYNxE L. REV. 1543 (1971). Such rights
of candidates may also be based on the theory that political candidacy is a protected
activity within the scope of freedom of expression and freedom of association under
the First Amendment. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For an historical
argument that the Constitution does not contain a right to candidacy, see Avins, The
Right to Hold Public Office and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 18
MERCER L. REV. 367 (1967).
The Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized the rights of candidates. See
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). Rather, by protecting the rights of voters, the
Court has protected candidates' rights without acknowledging their existence. See, e.g.,
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). ("The right of a party or an individual
to a place on the ballot is entitled to protection and is intertwined with the rights
of voters"); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) ("[although] initial and direct
impact of filing fees is felt by aspirants for office, rather than voters . . . the
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat sep-
aration; laws that affect candidates always have some theoretical, correlative effect
on voters"); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (although the discriminatory pro-
cedures directly burdened candidacy, the unequal burden test is derived from bur-
dens placed on the right to vote and associate). Lower courts, however, have recog-
nized such rights. The strongest judicial assertion of a candidate's rights is Shakman
v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970). The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that an independent candidate for a state constitutional
convention delegate's seat was denied equal protection of the laws by a patronage
system that discriminated against his candidacy. The court held that the alleged official
conduct, if proved, violated the plaintiff's right to an "equal chance" in an electoral
contest and the voters' right to an "equally effective voice." Id. at 270. See also White
v. Snear, 313 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (use of a patronage system considered clear
violation of equal protection); Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187
(E.D. Mich. 1970) (right to candidacy protected); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716,
94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578 (1971) (the right to run for public office is as
fundamental as the right to vote); Note, Official Coercion of Patronage Employees to
Campaign for Party.Endorsed Candidates, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1547 (1971); Note, Political
Patronage and the Independent Candidate, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 390 (1971).
Of course judicial recognition of candidates' rights does not mean that those rights,
like voting rights, are not subject to reasonable regulation, such as to age, residency,
and citizenship. See, e.g.,- Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See
also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (filing fees); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971) (petition requirements).
The failure to recognize the rights of candidates has several adverse consequences.
First, it has caused confusion in the lower courts. Compare Heiser v. Rhodes, 305 F.
Supp. 269 (S.D. Ohio 1969), with Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, supra;
White v. Snear, supra; and Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, supra. Furthermore,
if the rights of candidates are protected only because of their correlative relation to
the rights of voters, then candidates may be required to demonstrate specifically how
a particular state statute actually abridges the rights of a certain class of voters. Such
an evidentiary barrier would unnecessarily impede the vindication of the interests of
both the candidate and the voters. Finally, the theory of candidates' rights would pro-
vide a sounder constitutional foundation than presently exists for efforts to equalize
the status of candidates in the electoral arena, such as limitations on contributions and
expenditures. The constitutional issues raised by these proposals have been widely
discussed. See, e.g.. H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCES: Two VIEWS OF
THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1971); A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGU-
LATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS (1972); Fleishman, Free-
dom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitutionality of the
Federal Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C. L. REV. 389 (1973). For a constitutional analysis
of the manner in which public officeholder perquisites disadvantage challengers, en-
trench incumbents, and cause unfair elections, see Note, Congressional Perquisites and
Fair Elections: The Case of the Franking Privilege, 83 YALE L.J. 1055, 1080-83 (1974).
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the New York Election Law also operates in a manner that deprives
those voters and candidates of due process of law.
This denial of due process stems from the incompatibility of the
partisanship of the election officials with the judicial, or quasi-judicial,
nature of their positions. Nearly 50 years ago the Supreme Court
held in Tumey v. Ohio8 ' that a "situation in which an official per-
force occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions,
one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of
due process of law."82 Tumey involved a practice in which persons
charged with violating the Ohio Prohibition Statute were tried be-
fore judges whose salaries were supplemented by the fines obtained
from convictions. The Court ruled that subjecting an individual to
a trial before a judge with such a "direct, personal, substantial, pe-
cuniary interest" in convicting him was a denial of due process.
83
This decision was recently extended in Ward v. Village of Monroe-
ville.84 In Ward, the mayor of Monroeville was the judge of the vil-
lage traffic court; although the mayor's salary did not depend on the
fines collected from convictions, thereby excluding any direct pecu-
niary interest, the Court held that his position as the village's chief
financial officer was sufficient to disqualify him as a neutral judge.
The Court stated the due process test for prejudice as whether the offi-
cial's situation "would offer a possible temptation to the average man"
to forget his legal obligations.8, Although Tumey and Ward involved
criminal trials, the same standards of due process are also applicable
to quasi-judicial proceedings or administrative adjudications.86
Two threshold questions therefore arise. First, are the New York
81. 273 US. 510 (1927).
82. Id. at 534.
83. Id. at 523.
84. 409 US. 57 (1972). But cf. Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).
85. Id. at 60, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. at 532.
86. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). which involved the issue of whether
certain due process requirements must be extended to administrative proceedings of
the United States Civil Rights Commission. The Supreme Court's opinion represents an
attempt to delineate those types of administrative proceedings that could be considered
to exercise sufficient "judicial power" to require adherence to due process standards.
The Court announced the rule that "when governmental agencies adjudicate or make
binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is im-
perative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been asso-
ciated with the judicial process." Id. at 442.
"Adjudicate" seems to be the operative word. Due process standards were not ex-
tended to the Civil Rights Commission in Hannah because it was deemed to be merely
an investigative body, not having an adjudicative function. 363 U.S. at 441. See gen-
erally Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1967); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968);
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
For an analysis of the several types of bias that may be sufficient to disqualify a
judicial or administrative officer, see K. DAVis, ADMINIMSATIVE LAW TEXT § 12.04, at
245-53 (1972) ("[m]ost of the law concerning disqualification because of interest ap-
plies with equal force to ... administrative adjudicators").
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City election commissioners and inspectors partisan? Second, do they
perform judicial, or quasi-judicial, functions?
There should be little doubt as to the issue of partisanship. Elec-
tion officials in New York are selected on the basis of their political
views by the party leaders;8 7 not only are such officials partisan, there-
fore, but they are also beholden to those who control the regular
faction of the party.88 Moreover, the notion that the election pro-
cedure actually operates in a fair and bipartisan manner is a myth. 9
Even without the documented partisanship and misconduct that oc-
curred in the Lowenstein-Rooney primary, the operation of the
New York Election Law indicates that election officials are involved
in a situation that presents at least a "possible temptation to the
average man."
Less clear is the issue of whether the tasks performed by election
commissioners and inspectors are sufficiently judicial in character to
be within the scope of the Tumey-Ward due process test. In Socialist
Workers Party v. Rockefeller,9" the only court directly to consider
this question answered it in the negative. In 1970 members of the
Socialist Workers Party challenged the New York Election Law, claim-
ing it denied them due process by allowing partisan members of the
Board of Elections to judge the sufficiency of nominating petitions
filed by minority party candidates. The district court ruled Tumey
and Ward inapplicable to the New York Election Law because "the
tasks delegated to the election commissioners are basically ministerial,
and subject to judicial review by an impartial court. Moreover, plain-
tiffs tender no specific examples of abuse." 91
This decision, while seemingly dispositive of the due process issue
as it relates to election officials in New York, deserves closer con-
sideration for at least three reasons. First, the court in Socialist Workers
Party required the plaintiffs to document specific examples of abuse,
even though the Supreme Court in Ward found a denial of due
process upon a showing of potential prejudice unaccompanied by par-
ticular instances of actual improprieties.9 2 Moreover, the argument
87. See pp. 66-67 supra.
88. Id.
89. See pp. 64-65 supra.
90. 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), afrd, 400 U.S. 806 (1970).
91. Id. at 997.
92. Compare id. at 997, with 409 U.S. at 61-62. See also Pirincin v. Board of Elections,
368 F. Supp. 64, 77 (1973) (bias will not be inferred without proof of actual dis-
crimination). Although the Court erred in Socialist Workers Party by requiring spe-
cific examples of abuse, it would be proper to require some showing of potential
prejudice before a statute was declared unconstitutional on due process grounds. This
potentiality can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a particular situation
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that any injustice suffered by petitioners could be corrected by ap-
peal was specifically rejected in Ward.93 Finally, a subsequent de-
cision casts considerable doubt on the validity of the holding in So-
cialist Workers Party. Weiss v. Duberstein94 involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of one of the provisions of the New York Election
Law that govern the selection of election commissioners. In holding
that a constitutional issue existed and that abstention by the district
court was improper, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
cited at length the substantial duties and responsibilities of the New
York City Board of Elections and stated the Board was "no mere
clerical staff, nor are the tasks delegated to it merely ministerial."95
Of course, not every act of the Board of Elections partakes of a
judicial quality, but certainly some of the Board's acts do. Adminis-
trative agencies perform judicial functions, and hence are subject to
due process requirements, when they "adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individu-
als . . . ."9 Examples of powers exercised by the Board of Elections
which come within this definition of judicial function include: re-
moval for cause of appointed election officials; 97 preparation of a list
challenging those voters who have lost the right to register from a
given address;98 determination that a voter is not entitled to an ab-
and type of prejudice. In other cases, general background and history may be more
important than the abstract character of the prejudice. But even with the highest
standard-that of specific abuse-sufficient examples of discrimination exist to support
a finding that the New York Election Law results in an unconstitutional denial of
due process.
93. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held that that Ohio procedure could
not "be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers
a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached
judge in the first instance." Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
94. 445 F.2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1971).
95. Id. at 1302 (emphasis supplied). Weiss is significant not only for the view it
expresses of election commissioners, but also because it is another example of the
anachronistic nature of the New York Election Law. Plaintiff Weiss challenged § 31 of the
statute, which in 1971 provided for the selection of election commissioners upon
recommendations made by the county chairmen of the New York and Kings County
committees of the two major political parties in the state. He argued that § 31
denied the Republican and Democratic County Committees of Bronx, Queens, and
Richmond counties of the right to certify party members for appointment.
This version of § 31 had been enacted in the early part of the 20th century, when
New York and Kings Counties were the most populous counties in New York City.
In 1900, 88 percent of the population of the city lived in Kings or New York County.
But in 1971, the County Committees of Kings and New York enjoyed the same ex-
clusive privilege, although their aggregate population consisted of only 56 percent
of the total city population. 445 F.2d at 1300-01. On remand from the Court of Ap-
peals, Judge Frankel found the limitation on the certifying power to be unconsti-
tutional. Civil No. C70-1200 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1971), af 'd, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972). His decision was soon followed by corrective state
legislation. See N.Y. ELECrON LAW § 31 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
96. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
97. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 45 (McKinney 1964).
98. Id. § 410.
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sentee ballot;99 and resolution of objections to a petition, or certificate
of designation, or nomination. 100 Although not exhaustive, these enu-
merated responsibilities are indicative of the important decisions made
by the Board of Elections that directly determine individual rights.
In their totality, the functions performed by election inspectors
are also judicial in nature. The discretionary powers of these officers
are enormous and relatively unchecked. 1' 1 It is no exaggeration to
maintain that they actually control whether or not a person votes,
and this certainly qualifies as a determination of the legal rights of
individuals. 02 This discretion assumes particular importance in light
of the fact that a decision by an election inspector that deprives a
voter of the franchise can only be overruled by a court order.103 The
process of obtaining such an order is so time-consuming and incon-
venient that it is unrealistic to expect many voters to pursue it.104
Hence, judicial review in this situation is simply not a realistic
remedy for an aggrieved person. 0 5
The partisan nature of election officials in New York is undeniable.
The proposition that the tasks they perform are judicial, or quasi-
judicial, is supported by both logic and precedent. Therefore, the
due process standards of Tumey and Ward should be applied to in-
validate as unconstitutional the New York Election Law.
IV. Reform of the New York Election Law
If, as this Note has argued, the New York Election Law is uncon-
stitutional in its method of selecting election officials, the state must
reconsider the issue of election administration and enact appropriate
legislation. This section will outline briefly the considerations that
should guide this effort.'0 6
99. N.Y. ELECTMON LAW §§ 117, 117a, 118 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
100. N.Y. ELE rioN LAW § 145 (McKinney 1964).
101. See pp. 64-65 supra & note 13 supra.
102. See id.; Note, supra note 28, at 662-63.
103. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 331 (McKinney 1964).
104. For reports of the difficulties experienced by challenged voters seeking court
orders, and the attempts by the Board of Elections to provide judicial review, see
N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1972, at 37, col. 1; id., Sept. 20, 1972, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Post,
Sept. 20, 1972 at 3, col. 1.
105. The denial of due process may also be viewed as an infringement of the
rights of candidates as well as those of voters. See note 80 supra. A candidate wishing
to challenge an election as violative of due process confronts many of the same prac-
tical difficulties as a voter. The Lowenstein suit represents a type of litigation that few
candidates can undertake.
106. A comprehensive description of any particular system for selecting election
officials-including specifications as to compensation, training, qualifications, and term
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There are two basic approaches to election administration. A state
can strive to attain fair elections through a system based on either
partisanship or nonpartisanship. These alternatives present the basic
policy questions here at issue, and the choice between them will de-
termine the characteristic features of the state system of election ad-
ministration.
To describe a system as based on the principle of partisanship does
not imply that it necessarily operates in a partisan or biased man-
ner.10 7 A system founded on partisanship seeks to secure fair elections
through the checks and balances created by placing officials of dif-
fering political views in administrative positions. 08 Whether bipar-
tisan'09 or multipartisan, 1 0 such a system is premised on the belief
that political competition will adequately deter electoral misconduct.
The inherent weaknesses of a partisan system, and especially a bi-
partisan one, have already been demonstrated."' It is not incon-
ceivable, however, that a partisan system could be established that
is effective and hence constitutionally permissible. For a partisan
system to operate effectively, it must be sufficiently flexible to allow
for representation on election boards of all significant elements of
the electorate. A system based on the check provided by competitive
impulses must insure that the election administration accurately re-
flects the political competition in the electorate." 2 Hence, provision
must be made for the representation of both the internal party fac-
tions in primary elections, and minority parties and independents in
general elections. Limitations on the type or number of electoral
groups that may be represented" 3 are inconsistent with the underlying
principle of the partisan system and may also result in an unconstitu-
tional system of unfair election procedures.
As a guarantee of electoral fairness, the basic alternative to reliance
on partisan competition is a nonpartisan system."14 The major ad-
of office-is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, the basic policy choices, rather than
detailed plans for their implementation, are outlined and evaluated. For the most de-
tailed treatment of the problem of election administration, see J. HARMs, supra note 27.
107. See note 11 supra.
108. See p. 68 supra.
109. See note 41 supra.
110. See note 40 supra.
Ill. See pp. 71-72 supra.
112. See note 11 supra.
113. Presumably, a de minimis test would be permissible. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134 (1972), where the Court recognized that the state had some interest in
discouraging frivolous candidates from burdening election administration and the voters.
The means used to deter the frivolous, though, must be narrowly drawn so as not to
infringe on fundamental rights.
114. See, e.g., CAL. ErEaaONS CODE § 1615 (West 1961).
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vantage of this type of system is that it eliminates partisan political
considerations from election administration. Nonpartisanship is pre-
mised on the theory that selection of election officials on a basis other
than party affiliation and loyalty will ultimately lead to elections be-
ing administered in a more neutral and disinterested manner. More-
over, nonpartisanship eliminates any constitutional problems that
arise from the exclusion of certain segments of the electorate from
election administration." 5
The principal disadvantage of the nonpartisan approach is that it
may place a greater burden on the system of election administration.
For example, in New York City alone, 23,000 inspectors are needed
on election day." 6 Under the current New York law, recruitment of
election officials is made easy by requiring the parties to provide
the necessary manpower."l 7 However, the greater burden resulting
from a nonpartisan system may be outweighed by the value to society
of democratic elections administered both fairly and competently by
officials selected on a basis other than party loyalty. Moreover, the
state may be able to employ a variety of techniques to minimize the
burden."1
8
Within constitutional limits, the ultimate choice between the two
basic alternatives is entrusted to the state legislature. A prudent de-
cision can be made only after careful and thorough consideration of
political and financial realities. Such a process should begin immedi-
ately in order to correct the inadequacies of the anachronistic and
unconstitutional New York Election Law.
Conclusion
The right of suffrage is a meaningless formality where fair elections
do not exist. Although designed to insure fairness, the manner in
which New York selects those who administer its elections actually
insures partisan control of the state's election machinery. The legal
115. See pp. 75-77 supra.
116. Interview with David Dinkins, former President of the New York City Board
of Elections, in New York City, Nov. 2, 1973.
117. See p. 66 supra.
118. A variety of mechanisms could be used to produce the number of people
needed to serve as election officials. Certain civil service employees could be diverted
from their regular work for one day. The state legislature could declare election day
a public holiday, thereby creating a vast reservoir of individuals with the ability to
volunteer time. Public schools are regularly used as polling places. Public school teachers,
then, are an obvious labor force that may be available. Arrangements could be made
with major institutional employers to pay employees for days spent serving as election
officials, just as many now do for employees serving on juries.
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result of this statutory scheme is a system that violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by unconstitutionally burdening the fundamental
rights to vote and to associate. Furthermore, due process of law is
denied by a statute that requires the electoral rights of voters and
candidates to be determined by partisan individuals performing ju-
dicial, or quasi-judicial, functions.
Various reforms of the New York Election Law are both desirable
and feasible. It is the responsibility of the state legislature to determine
and enact appropriate reforms in order to protect the fundamental
value of fair elections in a democracy.
